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John B. Taylor 
This paper examines several eras and episodes of U.S. monetary history from 
the perspective of  recent research on monetary policy rules.’ It explores the 
timing and the political economic reasons for changes in monetary policy from 
one policy rule to another, and it examines the effects of different monetary 
policy rules on the economy. The paper also defines-using  current infonna- 
tion and the vantage point of history-a  quantitative measure of  the size of 
past mistakes in monetary policy. And it examines the effects that these mis- 
takes may have had on the economy. The history of these changes and mistakes 
is relevant for monetary policy today because it provides evidence about the 
effectiveness of different monetary policy rules. 
The Rationale for a Historical Approach 
Studying monetary history is, of course, not the only way to evaluate mone- 
tary policy. Another approach is to build structural models of the economy and 
then simulate the models stochastically with different monetary policy rules. 
John B. Taylor is the Mary and Robert Raymond Professor of Economics at Stanford University 
and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
The author thanks Lawrence Christiano, Richard Clarida, Milton Friedman, conference partici- 
pants, and participants in seminars at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Lehigh University, 
and Wayne State University for very helpful comments. 
1.  In this paper a monetary policy  rule is defined as a description-expressed  algebraically, 
numerically, graphically-of  how the instruments of  policy, such as the monetary base or the 
federal funds rate, change in response to economic variables. Thus a constant growth rate rule for 
the monetary base is an example of a policy rule, as is a contingency plan for the monetary base. 
A description of how the federal funds rate is adjusted in response to inflation or real GDP is 
another example of a policy rule. A policy rule can be normative or descriptive. According to this 
definition, a policy rule can be the outcome of many different institutional arrangements for mone- 
tary policy, including gold standard arrangements in which there is no central bank. The term 
regime is usually used more broadly than the specific definition of a policy rule used in this paper. 
E.g., the term “policy regime” is used by Bordo and Schwartz (1999) to mean people’s expecta- 
tions as well as the institutional arrangements. 
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A model economy provides information about how the actual economy would 
operate with different policies. One monetary policy rule is better than another 
monetary policy rule if it results in better economic performance according to 
some criterion such as inflation or the variability of inflation and output.*  This 
model-based approach has led to practical proposals for monetary policy rules 
(see Taylor 1993a), and the same approach is now leading to new or refined 
proposals. The model-based approach has benefited greatly from advances in 
computers, solution algorithms, and economic theories of how people forecast 
the future and how market prices and wages adjust to changing circumstances 
over time. 
Despite  these  advances, the  model-based approach  cannot  be  the  sole 
grounds for making policy decisions. No monetary theory is a completely reli- 
able guide to the future, and certain aspects of the current models are novel, 
especially the incorporation of rational expectations with wage and price rigid- 
ities. Hence, the historical approach to monetary policy evaluation is a neces- 
sary complement to the model-based approach. By focusing on particular epi- 
sodes or case studies one may get a better sense about how a policy rule might 
work in practice. Big historical changes in policy rules-even  if they evolve 
slowly-allow  one to  separate policy  effects from other influences on the 
economy. Because models, even simple ones, are viewed as black boxes, the 
historical approach may be more convincing to policy maker^.^ Moreover, case 
studies are useful for judging how much discretion is appropriate when a pol- 
icy rule is being used as a guideline for central bank decisions. 
Overview 
I begin the analysis with a description of the framework I use to examine 
the history of monetary policy rules. I focus entirely on interest rate rules in 
which the short-term interest rate instrument of the central bank is adjusted in 
response to the state of the economy. When analyzing monetary policy using 
the concept of a policy rule, one must be careful to distinguish between instru- 
ment changes due to “shifts” in the policy rule and instrument changes due to 
“movements along” the policy rule. To make this distinction, I assume a partic- 
ular functional form for the policy rule. The functional form is the one I sug- 
gested several years ago as a normative recommendation for the Federal Re- 
serve (Taylor 1993a). According to this policy rule, the federal funds rate is 
adjusted by specific numerical amounts in response to changes in inflation and 
2.  Examples  of  this approach include the econometric  policy evaluation  research  in Taylor 
(1979, 1993b), McCallum (1988), Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993), Sims and Zha (1995), Ber- 
nanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997), Brayton et al. (1997), and many of the papers in this confer- 
ence volume. 
3. In fact, the historical approach is frequently used in practice by policymakers, although the 
time periods are so short that it may seem like real-time learning. If policymakers were using a 
particular type of policy and found that it led to an increase in inflation, or a recession, or a 
slowdown in growth, then they probably would, at the next opportunity, change the policy, learning 
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real GDP. This functional form with these numerical responses describes the 
actual policy actions of the Federal Reserve fairly accurately in recent years, 
but in this paper I look at earlier periods when the numerical responses were 
different and examine whether economic performance of the economy was any 
different. 
I examine several long time periods in U.S. monetary history, one around 
the end of the nineteenth century and the others closer to the end of the twenti- 
eth century. The earlier period from 1879 to 1914 is the classical international 
gold standard era; it includes 11 business cycles, a long deflation, and a long 
inflation. The later period from 1955 to 1997 encompasses the fixed exchange 
rate era of Bretton Woods and the modem flexible exchange rate era, including 
7 business cycles, an inflation, a sharp disinflation, and the recent  15-year 
stretch of relatively low inflation and macroeconomic stability. The change in 
the policy rule over these periods has been dramatic. The type of policy rule 
that describes Federal Reserve policy actions in the past 10 or 15 years is far 
different from the ones implied by the gold standard, by Bretton Woods, or by 
the early part of the flexible exchange rate era. 
It turns out that macroeconomic performance-in  particular, the volatility 
of inflation and real output-was  also quite different with the different policy 
rules. Moreover, the historical comparison gives a clear ranking of  the pol- 
icy rules in terms of  economic performance. To  ensure that this ranking is 
not spurious-reflecting  reverse causation, for example-I  try to examine the 
reasons for the policy changes. I think these changes are best understood as 
the result of an evolutionary learning process in which the Federal Reserve- 
from the day it began operations in  1914 to today-has  searched for policy 
rules to guide monetary policy decisions and has changed policy rules as it 
has learned. 
I then consider three specific episodes when “policy mistakes” were made. 
I define policy mistakes as big departures from two baseline monetary policy 
rules that both this historical analysis and earlier models-based analysis sug- 
gest would have been good policy rules. According to this definition, policy 
mistakes include (1) excessive monetary tightness in the early 1960s, (2) ex- 
cessive monetary ease and the resulting inflation of the late 1960s and 1970s, 
and (3) excessive monetary tightness of the early 1980s. I contrast these three 
episodes with the more recent period of low inflation and macroeconomic sta- 
bility during which monetary policy has followed the baseline policy rule more 
closely. I think the analysis of these three episodes and the study of the gradual 
evolution of the parameters of monetary policy rules from one monetary era to 
the next gives evidence in favor of the view that a monetary policy that stays 
close to the baseline policy rules would be a good p01icy.~ 
4. Judd and Trehan (1995) first brought attention to the difference between the interest rates 
implied by the policy rule I suggested in Taylor (1993a) and actual interest rates in the late 1960s 
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7.1  From the Quantity Equation of Money to a Monetary Policy Rule 
The quantity equation of money (MV = PY)  provided the analytical frame- 
work with which Friedman and Schwartz (1963) studied monetary history in 
their comprehensive study of the United States from the Civil War to 1960. As 
they state in the first sentence of their study, “This book is about the stock of 
money in the United States.” A higher stock of money (M)  would lead to a 
higher price level (P)  other things-namely,  real output (Y)  and velocity (V)- 
equal, as they showed by careful study of episode after episode. In each epi- 
sode they demonstrated why the money stock increased (gold discoveries in 
the nineteenth century, for example) or decreased (policy mistakes by the Fed- 
eral Reserve in the twentieth century, for example), and they focused on the 
roles of particular individuals such as William Jennings Bryan and Benjamin 
Strong. But the quantity equation of money transcended any individual or insti- 
tution: with the right interpretation it was useful both for the gold standard and 
the greenback period and whether a central bank existed or not. 
The idea in this paper is to try to step back from the debates about current 
policy, as Friedman and Schwartz (1963) did, and examine the history of mon- 
etary policy via an analytical framework. However, I  want to focus on the 
short-term interest rate side of monetary policy rather than on the money stock 
side. Hence, I need a different equation. Instead of the quantity equation I use 
an equation-called  a monetary policy rule-in  which the short-term inter- 
est rate is a function of the inflation rate and real GDP.5  The policy rule is, of 
course, quite different from the quantity equation of money, but it is closely 
connected to the quantity equation. In fact, it can be easily derived from the 
quantity equation. To a person thinking about current policy, the quantity equa- 
tion might seem like an indirect route to a interest rate rule for monetary policy, 
but it is a useful route for the study of monetary history. 
7.1.1  Deriving a Monetary Policy Rule from the Quantity Equation 
First imagine that the money supply is either fixed or growing at a constant 
rate. We  know that velocity depends on the interest rate (r)  and on real output 
or income (Y).  Substituting for V in the quantity equation one thus gets a rela- 
tionship between the interest rate (r),  the price level (P),  and real output (Y). 
If we isolate the interest rate (r)  on the left-hand side of this relationship, we 
see a function of two variables: the interest rate as a function of the price level 
5. Two useful recent studies have looked at monetary history from the vantage point of a mone- 
tary policy rule stated in terms of  the interest rate instrument rather than a money instrument. 
These are Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998), who look at several other countries in addition to 
the United States, and Judd and Rudebusch (1998), who contrast U.S. monetary policies under 
Greenspan, Volker, and Bums. Clarida et al. (1998) show that British participation in the European 
Monetary System while Germany was tightening monetary policy led to a suboptimal shift of the 
baseline policy rule for the United Kingdom. Wo  earlier influential studies using the Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963) approach to monetary history and policy evaluation are Sargent (1986) and 
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and real output. Shifts in this function would occur when either velocity growth 
or money growth shifts. Note also that such a function relating the interest rate 
to the price level and real output will still emerge if  the money stock is not 
growing at a fixed rate, but rather responds in a systematic way to the interest 
rate or to real output; the response of money will simply change the parameters 
of the relationship. 
The functional form of the relationship depends on many factors including 
the functional form of the relationship between velocity and the interest rate 
and the adjustment time between changes in the interest rate and changes in 
velocity. The functional form I use is linear in the interest rate and in the loga- 
rithms of the price level and real output. I make the latter two variables station- 
ary by considering the deviation of real output from a possibly stochastic trend 
and by  considering the first difference of  the log of  the price level-or  the 
inflation rate. I also abstract from lags in the response of velocity to interest 
rates or income. These assumptions result in the following linear equation: 
(1)  r  =  IT  +  gy +  h(n - IT*)  +  rf, 
where the variables are r = the short-term interest rate, IT  = the inflation rate 
(percentage change in P),  and y = the percentage deviation of real output (Y) 
from trend and the constants are g, h, IT*,  and rf.  Note that the slope coefficient 
on inflation in equation (1) is 1 + h; thus the two key response coefficients are 
g and 1 + h. Note also that the intercept term is rf -  hv*.  An interpretation of 
the parameters and a rationale for this notation is given below. 
7.1.2  Interpreting the Monetary Policy Rule 
Focusing now on the functional form for the policy rule in equation (1), our 
objective is to determine whether the parameters in the policy rule vary across 
time periods and to look for differences in economic performance that might 
be related to any such variations across time periods. Note how this historical 
policy evaluation method is analogous to model-based policy evaluation re- 
search in which policy rules (like eq. [l])  with various parameter values are 
placed in a model and simulations of  the model are examined to see if  the 
variations in the parameter values make any difference for economic perfor- 
mance. Equation (1) is useful for this historical analogue of the model-based 
approach because it can describe monetary policy in different historical time 
periods when there were many different policy regimes. In each regime the 
response parameters g and 1 + h would be expected to differ, though in most 
regimes they would be positive. To see this, consider several types of regimes. 
Constant Money Growth. We have already seen that the quantity equation with 
fixed money growth implies a relationship like equation (1). To see that the 
parameters g and  1 + h are positive with fixed money growth consider the 
demand for money in which real balances depend negatively on the interest 
rate and positively on real output. Then, in the case of fixed money growth, an 324  John B. Taylor 
increase in inflation would lower real money balances and cause the interest 
rate to rise: thus higher inflation leads to a higher interest rate.6 Or suppose 
that real income rises thus increasing the demand for money; then, with no 
adjustment in the supply of money, the interest rate must rise. In other words, 
the monetary policy rule with positive values for g and 1 + h provides a good 
description of monetary policy in a fixed money growth regime. However, the 
monetary policy rule also provides a useful framework in many other situa- 
tions. 
International Gold Standard. Important for our historical purposes is that such 
a relationship also exists in the case of  an international  gold standard. The 
short-run response (1 + h)  of the interest rate to the inflation rate in the case 
of a gold standard is most easily explained by the specie flow mechanism of 
David Hume. If inflation began  to rise in the United  States compared with 
other countries, then a balance-of-payments deficit would occur because U.S. 
goods would become less competitive.  Gold would  flow out of  the United 
States to finance the trade deficit; high-powered money growth would decline 
and  the reduction  in the  supply of  money  compared with the  demand  for 
money would put upward pressure on U.S. interest rates. The higher interest 
rates and the reduction in demand for U.S. exports would put downward pres- 
sure on inflation in the United States.’ Similarly, a reduction in inflation in the 
United States would lead to a trade surplus, a gold inflow, an increase in the 
money supply, and downward pressure on U.S. interest rates. 
Fluctuations in real output would also cause interest rates to adjust. Suppose 
that there were an increase in real output. The increased demand for money 
would put upward pressure  on interest rates if the money supply were un- 
changed. Amplifying this effect under a gold standard would be an increase 
in the trade deficit, which would lead to a gold outflow and a decline in the 
money supply. 
These interest rate responses would occur with or without a central bank. If 
there were a central bank, it could increase the size of the response coefficients 
if it played by the gold standard‘s “rules of the game.”  Interest rates would be 
even more responsive, because a higher price level at home would then bring 
about an increase in the “bank rate” as the central bank acted to help alleviate 
the price discrepancies. The U.S. Treasury did perform some of the functions 
of  a central bank during the gold standard period; it even provided liquidity 
during some periods of financial panic, though not with much regularity  or 
predictability. However, there  is little evidence that the U.S. Treasury per- 
6.  Note that this effect of inflation on the interest rate is a short-term “liquidity effect” rather 
than a longer term “Fisherian” or “expected inflation” effect. The expected inflation effect would 
occur if the  growth rate of the money supply increased or if 7~*  (the target inflation rate in the 
policy rule) increased. 
7. Short-term capital flows would of course limit the size of  such interest rate changes. One 
reason why U.S. short-term interest rates did not move by very much in response to US.  inflation 
fluctuations (as shown below) may have been the mobility of capital. 325  A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules 
formed “rules of the game” functions as the Bank of England did during the 
gold standard era. 
Leaning against the Wind. The most straightforward application of  equation 
(1) is to situations where the Fed sets short-term interest rates in response to 
events in the economy. Then equation (1) is a central bank interest rate reaction 
function describing how the Federal Reserve takes actions in the money market 
that cause the interest rate to change in response to changes in inflation and 
real GDP. For example, if  the Fed “leaned against the wind,” easing money 
market conditions in response to lower inflation or declines in production and 
tightening money market conditions in response to higher inflation or increases 
in production, then one would expect g and 1 + h in equation (1) to be positive. 
However, “leaning against the wind” policies have not usually been  stated 
quantitatively; thus the size of the parameters could be very small or very large 
and would not necessarily lead to good economic performance. 
Monetary Policy Rule as a Guideline or Explicit Formula. Finally, equation (1) 
could represent a guideline, or even a strict formula, for the central bank to 
follow when making monetary policy decisions. As in the previous paragraph, 
decisions would be cast in terms of whether the Fed would raise or lower the 
short-term interest rate. But equation (1) would serve as a normative guide to 
these decisions, not simply a description of  them after the fact. If  the policy 
rule called for increasing the interest rate, for example, then the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) would instruct the trading desk to make open mar- 
ket sales and thereby adjust the money supply appropriately to bring about this 
increase. In this case, the parameters of equation (1) have a natural interpreta- 
tion: T* is the central bank‘s target inflation rate, rf is the central bank’s esti- 
mate of the equilibrium real rate of interest, and h is the amount by which the 
Fed raises the ex post real interest rate (I -  T)  in response to an increase in 
inflation. In the case that g = 0.5, h = 0.5,  T*  = 2, and rf = 2, equation (1) is 
precisely the form of the policy rule I suggested in Taylor (1993a). Others have 
suggested that g  should be larger, perhaps closer to one (see Brayton et al. 
1997). Thus an alternative baseline rule considered below sets g = 1. These 
are the parameter values that define the baseline policy rules for historical com- 
parisons in this paper. 
7.1.3 
To  summarize, a constant growth rate of  the money stock, an international 
gold standard, an informal policy of leaning against the wind, and an explicit 
quantitative policy of interest rate setting all will tend to generate positive re- 
sponses of the interest rate to changes in inflation or real output, as described 
by  equation (I). And we expect that g  and 1 + h in equation (1) would be 
greater than zero in all these situations. However, the magnitude of these co- 
efficients will differ depending on how monetary policy is run. 
In the case of the gold standard or a fixed money growth policy, the size of 
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the coefficients depends on many features of the economy. Under a gold stan- 
dard, the size of the response of the interest rate to an increase in inflation will 
depend on the sensitivity of trade flows to international price differences. It 
will also depend on the size of the money multiplier, which translates a change 
in high-powered money due to a gold outflow into a change in the money 
supply. The interest rate elasticity of the demand for money is also a factor. 
With a policy that keeps the growth rate of the money stock constant, the 
response of the interest rate to an increase in real output will depend on both 
the income elasticity of money demand and the interest rate elasticity of money 
demand. The higher the interest rate elasticity of money demand (or velocity), 
the smaller would be the response of  interest rates to an increase in output or 
inflation. 
The size of these coefficients makes a big difference for the effects of policy. 
Simulations of economic models indicate, for example, that the coefficient h 
should not be negative; otherwise 1 + h will be less than one and the real 
interest rate would fall rather than rise when inflation rose. As a result inflation 
could be highly volatile. As I show below there is evidence that h was negative 
during the late  1960s and  1970s when  inflation rose in  the United  States. 
Hence, policymakers need to be concerned about the size of these coefficients. 
A recent example of  this concern demonstrates the usefulness of thinking 
about monetary history from the perspective of  equation (1). Consider Alan 
Greenspan’s (1997) recent analysis of the size of the interest rate response to 
real output with a constant money growth rate. In commenting on a money 
growth strategy, Greenspan reasoned: “Because the velocity of such an aggre- 
gate [Ml] varies substantially in response to small changes in interest rates, 
target ranges for MI growth in [the FOMC’s] judgement no longer were reli- 
able guides for outcomes in nominal spending and inflation. In response to an 
unanticipated movement in spending and hence the quantity of  money de- 
manded, a small variation in interest rates would be sufficient to bring money 
back to path but not to correct the deviation in spending” (1997,4-5).  In other 
words, in Greenspan’s view the interest rate elasticity of velocity is so large 
that the interest rate would respond by  too small an amount to an increase 
in output. In terms of equation (1) the parameter g is too small, according to 
Greenspan’s analysis, under a policy that targets the growth rate of M1. 
7.2  The Evolution of Monetary Policy Rules in the United States: 
From the International Gold Standard to the 1990s 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate the historical relation between the variables in 
equation (1). They show the interest rate (r),  the inflation rate (n),  and real 
GDP deviations  (y)  during two  different time periods:  1880-1914  versus 
1955-97. The upper part of each figure shows real output, an estimate of the 
trend in real output, and the percentage deviation of real output from this trend. 
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Fig. 7.1  The 1880-1914 period: short-term interest rate, inflation, 
and real output 
Source; Quarterly data on real GNP, the GNP deflator, and the commercial paper rate are from 
Balke and Gordon (1986). Real output data are measured in billions of 1972 dollars and the trend 
is created with the Hodrick-F’rescott filter. 
average output growth rate in the two periods. The lower part of  each figure 
shows a short-term interest rate (the commercial paper rate in the earlier period 
and the federal funds rate in the later period) and the inflation rate (a four- 
quarter average of the percentage change in the GDP deflator). Recall that the 
earlier period coincides with the classical international gold standard, starting 
with the end of the greenback era when the United States restored gold convert- 
ibility and ending with the suspension of convertibility by  many countries at 
the start of World War I. 
7.2.1  Changes in Cyclical Stability 
The contrast between the display of the data in figure 7.1 and figure 7.2 is 
striking. First, note that business cycles occur much more frequently in the 
earlier period (fig. 7.1) than in the later period (fig. 7.2), and the size of the 328  John B. Taylor 
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Fig. 7.2  The 1955-97  period: short-term interest rate, inflation, and real output 
Source: Quarterly data are from the DRI data bank. Real output is measured in billions of  1992 
dollars and the trend is created with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
fluctuations of  inflation and real output is much greater. From 1880 to 1897 
there was deflation on average. From 1897 to 1914 prices rose on average. But 
throughout the whole period there were large fluctuations around these aver- 
ages. The later period is not of course uniform in its macroeconomic perfor- 
mance. The late 1960s and 1970s saw a large and persistent swing in inflation, 
while the years since the mid-1980s have seen much greater macroeconomic 
stability. 
One way  to highlight the greater macroeconomic  turbulence in the earlier 
years is to consider the period from 1890 to 1897, which saw three recessions. 
These years were so bad that they were called the “Disturbed Years” by Fried- 
man and Schwartz (1963). One cannot avoid the temptation to contrast 1890- 
97 with 1990-97.  If we had the same  business cycle experience  in the later years, 
we would have had a recession in  1990-91  slightly longer than the one we 
actually had. But we would have also had another recession starting in January 
1993  just as President Clinton started in office and yet another recession start- 329  A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules 
ing in 1995. The trough of that third recession of the 1990s would have occured 
in June of  1997. Even allowing for measurement error due to overemphasis of 
goods versus services in the earlier period, it appears that the earlier period 
was less stable.8  To be sure, if one ignores the long swing of average deflation 
and then inflation, the fluctuations in inflation were much less persistent during 
the gold standard period, as emphasized in a comparison by  McKinnon and 
Ohno (1997, 164-71).  But this long-term deflation and inflation should count 
as part of the sub-par inflation performance during this period. 
7.2.2  Changes in Interest Rate Responses 
A second, and even more striking, contrast between the two periods is the 
response of the short-term interest rate to inflation and output. While the short- 
term interest rate is procyclical during both the earlier period and the later 
period, the elasticity of its response to output is clearly much less in the earlier 
period than in the later period. Cagan (1971) first pointed out the increased 
cyclical sensitivity of the interest rate to real output fluctuations, and it is more 
evident now than ever. The short-term interest rate is also much less responsive 
to fluctuations in the inflation rate in the earlier period. It appears that the gold 
standard did lead to a positive response of  interest rates to real output and 
inflation, but this response is much less than for the monetary policy in the 
post-World  War I1 period. 
The huge size of these differences is readily visible in figures 7.1 and 7.2. 
But to see how the responses changed during the post-World  War I1 period it 
is necessary to go beyond these time-series charts. Some numerical informa- 
tion about the size of these differences is provided in table 7. l.  The table shows 
least squares estimates of the coefficients on real output (the parameter g in 
eq. [  11)  and the inflation rate (the parameter 1 + h in eq. [  11) for different 
time  period^.^ 
The far right-hand column shows the results for each of the two full periods. 
Observe that the estimated values of g and 1 + h are about 10 times larger in 
the Bretton Woods and post-Bretton  Woods eras than in the international gold 
standard era. It is clear that the gold standard implied much smaller response 
coefficients for the interest rate than Federal Reserve policy has implied in 
later periods. 
8. Romer (1986) demonstrated that biases in the pre-World  War I data tend to overestimate the 
volatility in comparison with later periods. 
9. As explained above this equation is actually a reduced form of  several structural equations, 
especially in the  gold standard and Bretton Woods periods. I have purposely tried to keep the 
statistical equations as simple as the theoretical policy rule in eq. (1). No attempt has been made 
to correct the estimates for serial correlation of the errors in the equation. I want to allow for the 
possibility that monetary policy mistakes are serially correlated in ways not necessarily described 
by  simple time-series models. In fact, this serial correlation is very large, especially in the gold 
standard period when the equations fit very poorly. Hence, the “t-statistics” in parentheses are not 
useful for hypothesis testing. See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997) for a comprehensive 
analysis of estimation and identification issues in the case of reaction functions. 330  John B. Taylor 
Table 7.1  Monetary Policy Rules: Descriptive Statistics 
International Gold Standard Era 
1879:l-91:4  1897:  1-1914:4  1879:  1-1914:4 
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
Constant  6.458 (70.5)  5.519 (47.3)  5.984 (75.0) 
71  0.019 (1.01)  0.034 (1.03)  0.006 (0.32) 
Y  0.059 (2.28)  0.038 (1.89)  0.034 (1.52) 
R2  0.15  0.07  0.02 
Bretton Woods and Post-Bretton  Woods Eras 
1960:l-79:4  1987:l-97:3  1954:  1-97:3 
Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
Constant  2.045 (6.34)  1.174 (2.35)  1.721 (5.15) 
7r  0.813 (12.9)  1.533 (9.71)  1.101 (15.1) 
V  0.252 (4.93)  0.765 (8.22)  0.329 (3.16) 
R2  0.70  0.83  0.58 
Note; These are ordinary least squares estimates of the coefficients  of the variables in eq. (I).  The 
left-hand-side  variable (r)  is measured by the commercial paper rate for the years 1879-1914 and 
by the federal funds rate for the years 1954-97. The variable T is measured by the average inflation 
rate over four quarters, and the variable y is measured by the percentage deviation of real output 
from a trend. Numbers in parentheses are ratios of coefficients  to standard errors. See figs. 7.1 and 
7.2 for data sources. 
Note also that the size of  these coefficients has increased gradually over 
time. Compared with the 1960s and 1970s the coefficients on real output tri- 
pled in size by  the 1987-97  period while the coefficient on inflation doubled 
in size. They are now close to the values of  the rule I  suggested in Taylor 
(1993a). Hence, when viewed over the past century we have seen an evolution 
of the monetary policy rule as I have defined and characterized it empirically 
here. The monetary policy rule had very low interest rate responses during the 
gold standard era. It had higher responses during the 1960s and the 1970s, and 
it had still higher responses in the late 1980s and 1990s. 
7.2.3  A Graphical Illustration of the Importance 
of the Size of  the Inflation Response 
Figure 7.3 shows how  dramatically the monetary policy rule has changed 
from the 1960-70s  to the 1980-90s.  The two solid lines show two monetary 
policy rules corresponding to the two periods. The slopes of the solid lines 
measure the size of the interest rate responses to inflation in the policy rule. I 
abstract from output fluctuations in figure 7.3, by assuming that the economy 
is operating at full employment with real GDP equal to potential GDP (y = 
0). The dashed line in figure 7.3 has a slope of one and shows a constant real 
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Fig. 7.3  Two estimated monetary policy rules: 1960-79  versus 1987-97 
then the intersection of the dashed line and the policy rule line gives the long- 
run average inflation rate. 
Observe that the slope of the policy rule has gone from below one to above 
one. A slope below one would lead to poor economic performance according 
to variety of  models. With the slope less than one, an increase in inflation 
would bring about a decrease in the real interest rate. This would increase de- 
mand and add to upward pressures on inflation. This is exactly the wrong pol- 
icy response to an increase in inflation because it would lead to ever increasing 
inflation. In contrast, if the slope of the policy rule were greater than one, an 
increase in inflation would bring about an increase in the real interest rate, 
which would be stabilizing. 
These theoretical arguments are illustrated in figure 7.3. For a long-run equi- 
librium, we must be at the intersection of the policy rule line and the dashed 
line representing the long-run equilibrium real interest rate. If the slope of the 
policy rule line is greater than one, higher inflation leads to higher real interest 
rates and the inflation rate converges to an equilibrium at the intersection of 
the policy rule line and the dashed real interest rate line. For example, if the 
equilibrium real interest rate is 2 percent as in figure 7.3, the equilibrium infla- 
tion rate is about 1.5 percent for the recent, more steeply sloped, monetary 
policy rule in figure 7.3. However, if  the slope of  the policy rule line is less 332  John B. Taylor 
than one, higher inflation leads to a lower real interest rate, which leads to even 
higher inflation; the inflation rate is unstable and would not converge to an 
equilibrium. In sum, figure 7.3 shows why the inflation rate would be more 
stable in the 1987-97  period than in the 1960-79 period. 
7.3  Effects of the Different Policy Rules on Macroeconomic Stability 
Can one draw a connection between the different policy rules and the eco- 
nomic performance with those policy rules? In particular, within the range of 
policy rules we have seen, is it true that more responsive policy rules lead to 
greater economic stability? Making such a connection is complicated by other 
factors, such as oil shocks and fiscal shocks, but it is at least instructive to try. 
7.3.1  Three Monetary Eras 
As the analysis summarized in table 7.1 indicates, three eras of U.S. mone- 
tary history can be clearly distinguished by  big differences in the degree of 
responsiveness of short-term interest rates in the monetary policy rule. 
First, during the period from about 1879 to about 1914 short-term interest 
rates were very unresponsive to fluctuations in inflation and real output. Sec- 
ond, during the period from about 1960 to 1979 short-term interest rates were 
more responsive, but still small in the sense that the response of  the nominal 
interest rate to changes in inflation was less than one. Third, during the period 
from about 1986 to 1997 the nominal interest rate was much more responsive 
to both inflation and real output fluctuations. 
These three eras can also be distinguished in terms of overall economic sta- 
bility. Of the three, there is no question that the third had the greatest degree 
of economic stability. Figure 7.1 shows that both inflation and real output had 
smaller fluctuations during this period. The period contains both the first and 
second longest peacetime expansions in U.S. history. Moreover, inflation was 
low and stable. And, of course, this is the period in which the monetary policy 
rule had the largest reaction coefficients, giving support to model-based re- 
search that this was a better policy rule than those implied by  the two earlier 
periods. 
The relative ranking of the first and second periods is more ambiguous. Real 
output and inflation fluctuations were larger in the earlier period. But while 
inflation was more variable, there was much less persistence of inflation during 
the gold standard than in the late  1960s and  1970s. However, the different 
exchange rate regimes are another monetary factor that must be taken into 
account. It was the gold standard that kept the long-run inflation rate so stable 
in the earlier period. Bretton Woods may have provided a similar constraint on 
inflation during the early 1960s, but as U.S. monetary policy mistakenly be- 
came too easy, it was not inflation that collapsed, it was the Bretton Woods 
system. And after the end of Bretton Woods this external constraint on inflation 
was removed. With the double whammy of the loss of an external constraint 333  A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules 
and an inadequately responsive monetary policy rule in place, the inevitable 
result was the Great Inflation. 
If  one properly controls for the beneficial external influences of  the gold 
standard on long-run inflation during the 1879-1914 period, one obtains an un- 
ambiguous correlation between monetary policy rule and macroeconomic sta- 
bility. The most economically stable period was the one with the most respon- 
sive policy rule. The least economically stable (again adjusting for the gold 
standard effects) was the one with the least responsive policy rule. The late 
1960s and 1970s also rank lower than the most recent period in terms of eco- 
nomic stability and had a less responsive monetary policy rule. 
7.3.2 
In  any correlation analysis between economic policy  and economic out- 
comes there is the possibility of reverse causation. Could the lower respon- 
siveness of  interest rates in the two earlier periods compared with the later 
period have been caused by the greater volatility of inflation and real output? 
If  one examines the history of changes in the monetary policy rule I think it 
becomes clear that the answer is no. The evolution of the monetary policy rule 
is best understood as a gradual process of the Federal Reserve learning how to 
conduct monetary policy. This learning occurred through research by the staff 
at the Fed, through the criticism of  monetary  economists outside the Fed, 
through observation of central bank behavior in other countries, and through 
direct personal experience of  members of  the FOMC. And, of  course, there 
were steps backward as well as fonvard.'O 
This learning process occurred as the United States moved further and fur- 
ther away from the classical international gold standard. Under the gold stan- 
dard, increases and decreases in short-term interest rates were explained by  the 
interaction of the quantity of  money supplied (determined by  high-powered 
money through the inflow and outflow of  gold) and the quantity of  money 
demanded (which rose and fell as inflation and output rose and fell). A greater 
response of the short-term interest rate to rising or falling price levels and to 
rising or falling output would probably have reduced the shorter run variability 
of inflation and output. For example, lower interest rates during the start of the 
deflation period may  have prevented the deflation. But because of the fixed 
exchange rate feature of  the gold standard, the U.S.  inflation rate was con- 
strained to be close to the inflation rates of other gold standard countries; the 
degree of closeness depended on the size and the duration of  deviations from 
purchasing power parity. 
The Federal Reserve started operations at the same time as the classical gold 
standard ended: 1914. From the start there was therefore uncertainty and dis- 
Explaining the Changes in the Policy Rules 
10. If economists' research on the existence of a long-run trade-off between inflation and unem- 
ployment helped lead to the Great Inflation in the 1970s, then this research should be counted as 
a step backward. The effect of economic research and other factors that may have led to the Great 
Inflation are discussed in De Long (1997) and in my comment on De Long's paper. 334  John B. Taylor 
agreement about how monetary policy should be conducted without the con- 
straints of the gold standard and fixed exchange rates. The Federal Reserve Act 
indicated that currency-best  interpreted now as the monetary base or high- 
powered money-was  to be elastically provided. But how was the Fed to deter- 
mine the degree of this elasticity? 
The original idea was that two factors-each  pulling in an opposite direc- 
tion-were  to be balanced out. One was the gold standard itself; with a gold 
reserve requirement limiting the amount of Federal Reserve liabilities, the sup- 
ply of  money was limited. This was a long-run constraint on the supply of 
money; it worked through gold inflows and gold outflows and the gradual ad- 
justment of the U.S.  price level compared with foreign price levels. The other 
factor, which worked more quickly, was “real bills” or “needs of trade” doc- 
trine under which the supply of money was to be created in sufficient amounts 
to meet the demand for money. Clearly, the needs-of-trade criterion was not 
effective on its own because it did not put a limit on the amount of  money 
creation. Therefore, with the suspension of the gold standard and with the real 
bills criterion ineffective in determining the supply of money, the Federal Re- 
serve began operations with no criteria for determining the appropriate amount 
of money to supply. Hence, ever since this uncertain beginning, the Fed has 
been searching for such criteria. From the perspective of  this paper, we can 
think of the Fed as searching for a good monetary policy rule. 
This search is evident in many Federal Reserve reports. Early on, the idea 
of “leaning against the wind” was discussed as a counterbalance to the needs- 
of-trade criterion. For example, the Fed’s annual report for 1923 stated that “it 
is the business of the [Federal] Reserve system to work against extremes either 
of deflation or inflation and not merely to adapt itself passively to the ups and 
downs of business” (quoted in Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 253). But there 
was no agreement about how much leaning against the wind there should be. 
As discussed above, leaning against the wind would result in a policy rule of 
the type in equation (1), but the parameters of the policy rule could be far from 
optimal. That the Fed was  unable throughout the interwar period to find an 
effective policy rule for conducting monetary policy is evidenced by the disas- 
trous economic performance during the Great Depression when money growth 
fell dramatically. 
The search for a monetary policy rule was postponed during World War 
I1 and in the postwar period by  the overriding objective of keeping Treasury 
borrowing costs down. (Effectively the Fed set g = 0 and h = -1  so that r 
was a constant stipulated by the US. Treasury.) However, after the 1951 Trea- 
sury-Federal  Reserve Accord, the Fed once again needed a policy rule for 
conducting monetary policy. Leaning against the wind-now  articulated by 
William McChesney Martin-again  became a guideline for short-run deci- 
sions about changes in the money stock. But the idea was still very vague. As 
stated by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) in discussing the mid-1950s when 
William McChesney Martin was chairman, “There was essentially no discus- 335  A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules 
sion of how to determine which way the relevant wind was blowing. . . . Nei- 
ther was  there any discussion of  when to start leaning against the wind. . . . 
There was more comment, but hardly any of it specific about how hard to lean 
against the wind” (63 1-32). 
The experience of  new board member Sherman Maisel indicates that the 
search was still going on 10 years later in the mid-1960s. According to Maisel 
in his candid memoirs, “After being on the Board for eight months and at- 
tending twelve open market meetings, I began to realize how far I was from 
understanding the theory the Fed used to make monetary policy. . . . Nowhere 
did I find an account of how monetary policy was made or how it operated” 
(1973,  77).  Maisel was particularly concerned about various money market 
conditions indexes such as free reserves that came up in Fed deliberations, 
because of the difficulty of measuring the impact of these changes on the econ- 
omy. He states, “Money market conditions cannot measure the degree to which 
markets should be tightened or for how long restraint should be retained” (82). 
And when referring to a decision to raise the short-term interest rate in 1965, 
he states, “It became increasingly clear that an inflationary boom was getting 
underway and that monetary policy should have been working to curb it” (81). 
However, he argued that the actions taken to raise interest rates were insuffi- 
cient to curb the inflation. In retrospect he was correct. Interest rates did not 
go high enough. With no quantitative measure of how high interest rates should 
go, the chance of not raising them high enough was great. 
The increased emphasis on money growth in the 1970s played a very useful 
role in clarifying the serious problems of interest rate setting without any quan- 
titative guidelines. And money growth targets had a very useful role in the 
disinflation of the 1979-81 period because it was clear that interest rates would 
have to rise by  large amounts as the Fed lowered the growth rate of the money 
supply. But after the disinflation was over, money growth targets again receded 
to being a longer run consideration in Federal Reserve operations as the de- 
mand for money appeared to be less stable. Moreover, as noted earlier, ac- 
cording to Greenspan’s (1  997) analysis, keeping money growth constant does 
not give sufficient response of interest rates to inflation or real output when the 
aim is to keep inflation low and steady. 
The importance of  having a policy rule to guide policy became even more 
important when the Bretton Woods system fell apart in the early 1970s. Until 
then the long-run constraints on monetary policy were similar to those of the 
international gold standard. If  the Fed did not lean hard enough against the 
wind, the higher inflation rate would start to put pressure on the exchange rate 
and the Fed would have to raise interest rates to defend the dollar. But without 
the dollar to defend, this constraint on monetary policy was lost. After Bretton 
Woods ended there was an even greater need for the Fed to develop a monetary 
policy rule that was  sufficient to contain inflation without the external con- 
straint. This need was one of the catalysts for the rational expectations econo- 
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This brief review of the evolution of policy indicates that macroeconomic 
events,  economic  research,  and  policymakers  at  the  Fed  have  gradually 
brought forth changes in the monetary policy rule in the United States. I think 
this gradual evolution makes it clear that the causation underlying the negative 
correlation between the size of the policy response of interest rates to output 
or inflation and the volatility of  output or inflation goes from policy to out- 
come, not the other way around. 
If  we apply this learning hypothesis to the changes in the estimated policy 
rule described above, it suggests that the Federal Reserve learned over time to 
have higher response coefficients in a policy rule like equation (1). What led 
the Fed to change its policy in such a way that the parameter h changed from 
a negative number to a positive number? Experience with the Great Inflation 
of the 1970s that resulted from a negative value for h may be one explanation. 
Academic research on the Phillips curve trade-off and the effects of different 
policy  rules resulting from the rational  expectations revolution  may be  an- 
other. ‘‘ 
7.4  “Policy Mistakes”: Big Deviations from Baseline Policy Rules 
The historical analysis thus far in this paper has not assumed that any partic- 
ular policy rule was better than the others. However, that was the conclusion 
of the analysis: a comparison of policy rules and economic outcomes points to 
the rule the Fed has been using in recent years as a better way to run monetary 
policy than the way it was run in earlier years. That conclusion of the historical 
analysis bolsters the very similar conclusion of the model-based research sum- 
marized in the introduction to this paper. 
Once one has focused on a particular policy rule, however, there is another 
way to use history to check whether the policy rule would work well. With a 
preferred policy rule in hand, one can look at episodes in the past when the 
instrument of policy-the  federal funds rate in this case-deviated  from the 
settings given by the preferred policy rule. We can characterize such deviations 
as “policy mistakes” and see if the economy was adversely affected as a result 
of these mistakes.I2 
Figures 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 summarize the results of this historical  “policy 
mistake” analysis. They show the actual federal funds rate and the value of the 
federal funds rate implied  by  two policy rules. The gap between  the actual 
11. Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1998) argue that the Fed was too accommodative to 
inflation (h  was too low) in the 1970s because high expectations of inflation raised the costs of 
disinflation, rather than because the Fed still had something to learn about the Phillips curve trade- 
off or about the effects of different policy rules. I find the learning argument more plausible in 
part because it explains the end of the inflation and the change in the policy rule. 
12. We  are, of course,  looking at these past episodes  with the benefit of later research  and 
experience. The term “mistake” does not necessarily mean that policymakers of the past had the 
information to do things differently. 337  A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules 
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Fig. 7.4  Federal funds rate: too high in the early 1960s; too low in the late 
1960s 
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Fig. 7.5  Federal funds rate: too low in the 1970s; on track in 1979-81; too high 
in 1982-84 
Note: See note to fig. 7.4. 
federal funds rate and the policy rules is a measure of the policy mistake. One 
of  the monetary policy rules I use is the one I suggested in Taylor (1993a), 
which is equation (1) with the parameters g and h equal to 0.5. This is rule 1 
in figures 7.4,7.5, and 7.6. As mentioned above, more recent research has sug- 
gested that g should be closer to 1.0, giving a more procyclical interest rate. 
This variant is rule 2 in the figures. 338  John B. Taylor 
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Fig. 7.6  Federal funds rate: on track in the late 1980s and 1990s 
Nore: See note to fig. 7.4. 
The gap between the actual federal funds rate and the policy rule is particu- 
larly large in three episodes shown in figures 7.4 and 7.5, especially in compar- 
ison with the relatively small gap in the late 1980s and  1990s shown in fig- 
ure 7.6. 
The first episode occurred in the early 1960s when the mistake was making 
monetary policy too tight. Regardless of  whether g  is 0.5 or  1.0 the actual 
federal funds rate is well above the policy rule. The gap between the funds rate 
and the baseline policy was between 2 and 3 percentage points and this gap 
lasted for about three and a half years.I3 
It is interesting to note that Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 617) also con- 
cluded that monetary policy was overly restrictive during this period. They cite 
several reasons why policy may have been too tight. First, the Fed was con- 
cerned about the balance of payments and an outflow of gold. Second, in look- 
ing back at the previous recovery, it appeared to the Fed that policy had eased 
too soon after the recession. What was the result of  this policy mistake? The 
recovery from the  1960-61  recession was weak and the eventual expansion 
was slow for several years from about 1962 to 1965. In fact, the economy did 
not appear to catch up to its potential until 1965. The New Economics intro- 
duced by President Kennedy and his economic advisers was addressed at this 
prolonged period with real output below potential. 
The second episode started in the late 1960s and continued throughout the 
1970s-a  mistake with so much serial correlation it would pass a unit root test! 
In this case the monetary policy mistake was being way too easy. As shown in 
figures 7.4 and 7.5, the gap between the funds rate and the baseline policy 
13. With its high output response, rule 2 brings the interest rate below zero for several quarters, 
so the interest rate is set to a small positive number in the chart. 339  A Historical Analysis of  Monetary Policy Rules 
started growing in the late 1960s. It grew as large as 6 percentage points and 
persisted in the 4 to 6 percentage point range until the late 1970s when Paul 
Volcker took over as Fed chairman. The excessive ease in policy began well 
before the oil price shocks of the 1970s, thus raising doubts that these shocks 
were the cause of the 1970s Great Inflation. 
What caused this monetary policy mistake? Economic research of the 1960s 
suggested that there was a long-run trade-off between inflation and unemploy- 
ment; this research probably reduced some of the aversion to inflation by  the 
Federal Reserve. At the least the belief by  some in a long-run Phillips curve 
made defending low inflation more difficult at the Fed. Note that the mistake 
began well before the Friedman-Phelps hypothesis was put forward. Moreover, 
as the quotes from Maisel’s memoirs above make clear, the Fed‘s use of money 
market conditions caused them to understate the degree of tightness. De Long 
(1997) argues that the overly expansionary policy was due to a great fear of 
unemployment carried over from the Great Depression, though he does not 
attempt to explain why this mistake occurred when it did. While the causes of 
this mistake may be uncertain, there is little doubt that it was responsible for 
bringing on the Great Inflation of the 1970s. In my  view this mistake is the 
second most serious monetary policy mistake in twentieth-century US.  his- 
tory, the most serious being the Great Depression. If  a policy  closer to the 
baseline were followed, the rise in inflation may have been avoided. 
The third episode occurred after the disinflation of the early 1980s. The in- 
crease in interest rates in  1979 and 1980 was  about the right magnitude ac- 
cording to either of the policy rules. But both rule 1 and rule 2 indicate that 
the funds rate should have been lowered more than it was in the 1982-84  pe- 
riod. During this period the interest rate was well above the value implied by 
the two policy rules. However, it should be emphasized that this period oc- 
curred right after the end of the 1970s inflation, and interest rates higher than 
recommended by  the policy rules may  have been necessary to keep expecta- 
tions of inflation from rising and to help establish the credibility of the Fed. In 
effect the Fed was in a transition between policy rules. In my view this period 
has less claim to being a “policy mistake” than the other two periods. 
7.5  Conclusions 
The main conclusions of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, a 
monetary policy rule for the interest rate provides a useful framework with 
which to examine U.S. monetary history. It complements the framework pro- 
vided by  the quantity equation of  money so usefully employed by  Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963). Second, a monetary policy rule in which the interest rate 
responds to inflation and real output is an implication of many different mone- 
tary systems. Third, the monetary policy rule has changed dramatically over 
time in the United States, and these changes are associated with equally dra- 340  John B. Taylor 
matic changes in economic stability. Fourth, an  examination of the underlying 
reasons for the monetary policy changes indicates that they have caused the 
changes in economic outcomes, rather than the reverse. Fifth, a monetary pol- 
icy rule in which the interest rate responds to inflation and real output more 
aggressively than during the 1960s and 1970s or than during the international 
gold standard-and  more like the late 1980s and 1990s-is  a good policy rule. 
Sixth, if one defines policy mistakes as deviations from such a good policy 
rule, then such mistakes have been associated with either high and prolonged 
inflation or drawn-out periods of low capacity utilization, much as simple mon- 
etary theory would predict. 
Overall the results of the historical approach in this paper are quite consis- 
tent with the results of the model-based approach to monetary policy evalua- 
tion. But in an important sense this paper has only touched the surface; many 
other issues could be explored with a historical approach. For example, two 
difficult problems with monetary policy rules such as equation (1) have been 
mentioned by Alan Greenspan (1997): both potential GDP and the real rate of 
interest are uncertain. Uncertainty  about the level of potential GDP (and the 
natural rate of unemployment)  is a problem faced by monetary policymakers 
today regardless of whether they use a policy rule for guidance. Looking back 
at previous episodes and seeing the results of mismeasuring either potential 
GDP or the real rate of interest might help reduce the probability of  making 
the next monetary policy mistake. 
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Comment  Richard H. Clarida 
It is a pleasure to discuss this paper by John Taylor. In it, he proposes to use 
the Taylor rule as an analytical framework for the interpretation of monetary 
history, much as Friedman and Schwartz employed the quantity equation.  I 
agree with the approach that he is trying to promote, I concur in general with 
the inferences he draws from it, and I believe that this way  of interpreting 
monetary history can be, and in my work with Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler 
(1998a, 1998b) has already been, applied in fruitful ways that complement the 
application emphasized in this paper. 
Richard  H. Clarida is professor  of  economics and international affairs and chairman of  the 
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The basic idea is straightforward, and much of the paper is devoted to justi- 
fying its application. A baseline, or reference, time path of the short-term (fed- 
eral funds) interest rate is constructed using a Taylor (1993) rule of the form 
r,  =  rf  +  rr*  +  h(q - TT*)  +  gy,, 
where ri  is the long-run equilibrium real interest rate, TT*  is the long-run equi- 
librium rate of  inflation, and y, is the output gap. After the baseline is con- 
structed, the actual time path of the short-term interest rate is compared to the 
baseline path. Episodes (i.e., sequences of  observations) in which the funds 
rate is persistently higher than the baseline path are interpreted as episodes of 
excessively “tight” monetary policy, while episodes in which the funds rate is 
consistently below the baseline are interpreted as episodes in which monetary 
policy is too “easy.” Although Taylor provides some qualification in footnote 
12, he is explicit in his interpretation of  these episodes of “easy” and “tight” 
policy as representing policy mistakes. 
Now if, as we have learned from the central bankers present at this confer- 
ence, the Taylor rule can be and is used as a benchmark for assessing the cur- 
rent stance of  actual monetary policies, then certainly it can also be used as 
part of a framework to interpret monetary history. But certainly the caveats that 
apply to its use as a benchmark for current policy also apply, and perhaps with 
even greater force, to its use as a framework for interpreting monetary history. 
Unobservable but essential inputs to the Taylor rule such as the equilibrium 
real interest rate and the NAIRU fluctuate over time. Data get revised, and with 
these revisions the amplitudes-and  sometimes the signs-of  business cycle 
indicators appear much different with hindsight than they did to contemporar- 
ies. Taylor’s paper exhibits the appreciation and awareness of these issues that 
I would expect of him, and subsequent authors that pursue this approach would 
do well to emulate him. 
As applied to U.S. monetary policy since 1960, I believe Taylor’s interpreta- 
tions are largely correct. In fact, my  paper with Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler 
(1998a) makes very similar points using an estimated version of what we call 
a “forward-looking’’  Taylor rule. A forward-looking Taylor rule estimated over 
the post-1979 period-with  h = 1.96 and g = 0.07-captures  all the major 
swings in the funds rate. When we backcast the post-1979 rule on the pre-1979 
data, we also infer-as  does Taylor-that  policy was “too easy” between 1965 
and 1979. Indeed, our parameter estimates for the 1960-79  period (h = 0.80 
and g = 0.52) confirm Taylor’s interpretation that the source of the 1965-79 
policy mistake was that the Fed, when faced with an increase in  inflation, 
raised the funds rate, but by less than the rise in injation so that a  rise in 
inflation was countered by a fall in the real interest rate. This finding is per- 
fectly consistent with, indeed it can be viewed as the explanation for, Mishkin’s 
(1981) famous empirical result that during the 1970s the ex ante real interest 
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Why is it that before 1979, the Fed appears to have followed a policy that, 
with hindsight, was clearly inferior to the policy it has followed since? Ac- 
cording to Clarida et al.: 
Another way to look at the issue is to ask why it is that the Fed maintained 
persistently low short term real rates in the face of high or rising inflation. 
One possibility, emphasized by DeLong (1997), is that the Fed thought the 
natural rate of  unemployment at this time was much lower [and potential 
output higher] than it really was. . . . Another . . . possibility is that, at the 
time, neither the Fed nor the economics profession understood the dynamics 
of inflation very well. Indeed, it was not until the mid-to-late 1970s that. . . 
textbooks began emphasizing the absence of a long run trade-off between 
inflation and output. The idea that expectations may  matter in generating 
inflation and that credibility is important in policy-making were simply not 
well established during that era. What all this suggests is that in understand- 
ing historical economic behavior, it is important to take into account the 
state of  policy-maker’s knowledge of  the economy and how  it may  have 
evolved  over  time.  Analyzing  policy-making from  this  perspective,  we 
think, would be a highly useful undertaking. (1998a, 24) 
To this, I might add that I believe policymakers and the profession only began, 
in the late 196Os, to appreciate the distinction between movements in nominal 
and real interest rates. 
As Taylor suggests in his paper, a systematic policy of raising the funds rate 
by  less than inflation “would ultimately imply an unstable inflation rate.” In 
Clarida et al. (1998a), we embed a forward-looking Taylor rule with h < 1 in 
a version of the sticky price models found in King and Wolman (1996), Wood- 
ford (1996), and McCallum and Nelson (chap. 1 of this volume). We find that 
for h < 1, there can be bursts of inflation and output fluctuations that result 
from self-fulfilling changes in expectations. These sunspot fluctuations may 
arise because under this rule individuals correctly anticipate that the Fed will 
accommodate a rise in expected inflation by letting real interest rates decline. 
These sunspot fluctuations do not arise when h > 1. 
As  Taylor mentions in his paper, in Clarida et al. (1998b), we introduce 
another way to use the Taylor rule baseline to interpret recent monetary history. 
Specifically, we  interpret the collapse in September  1992 of  the European 
Monetary System (EMS) by  calculating for France, Italy, and Britain during 
the several years leading up to and several years following the collapse a stress 
indicator defined as 
fltr 
stress,,,  =  r,., -  J.l ’ 
When stressj,t  is positive, short-term interest rates in country j  are higher than 
they would be if they were set according to a Taylor rule based on inflation and 
output in country j.  Does this mean that monetary policy in country j  is “too 
tight”? In this instance no, because with the dismantling of capital controls in 
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gave up autonomy over their national monetary policies. The EMS evolved 
into a system in which Germany set the level of interest rates for all member 
countries; any remaining fluctuations in country-specific interest differentials 
with Germany reflected the changing sentiments of speculators regarding the 
commitment of that country to the fixed exchange rate. How then do we inter- 
pret a positive reading of  stress? It is a measure, in basis points, of the cost to 
country j of belonging to a fixed exchange rate system when monetary policy 
is not being set based on the macroeconomic conditions in country j. 
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Discussion Summary 
Laurence Bull asked Taylor for his conjecture on how much of the economy's 
better performance under Alan Greenspan than under Arthur Bums was attrib- 
utable to optimal policy and how much to better luck in the sense of not experi- 
encing the Vietnam War and two oil shocks. This could be addressed formally 
by  decomposing  output  variance  into the  variance  of  shocks  and  variance 
caused by deviations from the optimal rule. Taylor replied that his view on this 
issue was influenced by De Long (1997), who indicates that the policy mistake, 
under this definition, began well before the oil shocks. A more responsive pol- 
icy rule could have led to a bigger decline in output during the first oil shock, 
but it is quite likely that inflation would not have risen so much. Thus the econ- 
omy would have gotten away with  a much  smaller disinflation  in the early 
1980s. 
Bull then questioned the result that policy was too tight in  1983, whereas 
there was a rapid recovery going on during that time. Taylor responded that the 
policy mistake had already occurred at the beginning of 1982. While the gen- 345  A Historical Analysis of  Monetary Policy Rules 
era1 raising of  interest rates by  Volcker during 1979-81  was about right, the 
funds rate should have been lowered by a greater amount when the economy 
really sank. Glenn Rudebusch expressed doubts as to whether another measure 
of output gap rather than the one used in the paper would have shown such a 
deep recession for 1982. Taylor replied that the gap obtained with the Hodrick- 
Prescott filter looked  similar to the one in Judd and Trehan (1995). Martin 
Feldstein mentioned that part of  the reason for overtight interest rates at that 
point was that Volcker felt keeping up with the disinflation for much longer 
was politically unsustainable; hence, the disinflation had to occur in a shorter 
than optimal length of time. Edward Gramlich mentioned that Volcker shifted 
from the money to the funds standard during that period. This happened  at 
least in part because there was a shift in money demand due to, for example, 
interest payments on demand deposits. Donald Kohn added that money growth 
was accelerating toward the end of 1982  and inflation expectations were persis- 
tently  high,  much  higher  than  ex post  realized  inflation.  Frederic Mishkin 
added that after a history of bad policy, Volcker wanted to be tough in order to 
gain credibility. Ben McCallum mentioned that the Federal Reserve was below 
its M1 target in  1981. William Poole  stressed that the economy  sank much 
more quickly than anybody anticipated in 1982. There was an enormous inven- 
tory runoff, and the unemployment rate shot up in literally two months. 
Bob Hall noted that during the national bank era, prior to the creation of the 
Federal  Reserve, the control of the price level  was through the commodity 
definition of the dollar. Federal involvement in the portfolio sense of control- 
ling the quantity of  money was only indirect, through the national bank notes. 
Hall expressed concern about the fact that the paper repeats what he sees as 
the mistake of Friedman and Schwartz in trying to understand the commodity 
standard as if it were a portfolio-based monetary standard. Tuylor replied that 
the gold  standard kept the price level  stable during that period  through the 
pressure of purchasing power parity, similar to the early time in Bretton Woods. 
Michael  Woodford remarked that the coefficient on inflation for the nine- 
teenth-century period was even lower than in the 1970s. The Gibson paradox 
suggests that under the gold standard, interest rates seem to be related to the 
price level rather than the inflation rate. Even if interest rates rise with the price 
level but are not associated with the inflation rate, the real rate does not need 
to fall since the inflation rate and even the price level were mean reverting 
during that period. 
Robert King wondered about the determination of the trend in inflation with 
an interest rate rule. Under the monetarist, Friedman and Schwartz interpreta- 
tion the trend in money growth determines the trend in inflation. Taylor sug- 
gested thinking about the policy rule as an inverted money demand equation. 
An inflation coefficient greater than one will generate a stable inflation rate. If 
inflation rises, real interest rates rise in the same way as with a money-based 
rule. Therefore, this is not inconsistent with the money-based view on the de- 
termination of the inflation rate. 346  John B. Taylor 
King then noted that an output gap measured by the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
implied that the Federal Reserve had to react to output in the future. Taylor 
agreed but reminded him that already with revised data, as mentioned by Don- 
ald Kohn before, policy rules look very different than with actual data. 
Martin Feldstein remarked that Taylor rightly stresses, and the diagrams in 
the paper nicely  show, that  the response coefficient on inflation has  to be 
greater than one, so that when inflation increases, real rates rise. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, for the reasons given by De Long (1997), the focus was too much 
on nominal rates. Even though nominal rates were tightened, real rates were 
going down. However, what really matters are the real net rates as shown in 
the following equation: 
R,  = (1 - 0)’  1 - IT. 
If the nominal rate, i, is raised one to one with inflation, IT, the real net rate, 
R,,  falls by the marginal tax rate coefficient 8. If the real net rate should rise 
when inflation goes up, the derivative of  i with respect to T  has to be at least 
equal to 1/(1 -  0). The coefficient 0 is equal to 1/3, which means that in the 
policy rule, the coefficient on inflation should be greater than one. Of course, 
there are a lot of markets in which taxes do not matter or for some players the 
marginal tax rate is higher than that, so this makes not too much of a point 
about a value of exactly 1/3 for 8, but it makes a point that the coefficient on 
inflation should be greater than one and that 1.5 might not be a bad number 
at all. 
Poole recalled that in the early 1970s, Friedman’s natural rate hypothesis did 
not sweep the profession instantaneously. Year after year, prominent members 
of the profession came to the academic consultants’ meetings reporting that 
this was a nice theoretical idea, but that in practice there was a long-mn trade- 
off between unemployment and inflation. The real rate of interest was not yet 
a variable in the Federal Reserve’s macromodel, built in the mid-l960s, until 
its revision in 1968. The influence of fiscal policy on aggregate demand was 
vastly overestimated. The potential impact of tight money on housing and fis- 
cal policy-all  sorts of  excuses were made to delay actions. It was not until 
1975, the end of the Bums era, that the Federal Reserve finally decided that 
the long-run Phillips curve was indeed vertical. Ben McCallum noted that Tay- 
lor (1996) supports the point just made. A small piece of documentation is a 
long speech about inflation written by Arthur Bums and published by the Fed- 
eral Reserve Bank of Richmond during the late 1970s. In that 20-page docu- 
ment, monetary policy is not mentioned in any shape or form. 
McCallum liked Taylor’s approach of running a policy rule through history 
and encouraged further research in this direction. 
John Lipsky pointed out that market participants have paid increasing atten- 
tion to the Taylor rule formulation as an indicator of the appropriateness of Fed 
policy. Its predictive power has been extremely impressive over the past few 347  A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules 
years. Lipsky conjectured that the deregulation of financial markets and perva- 
sive securitization is enhancing the linkage between the real economy, policy, 
and financial markets. Thus the impact of monetary policy has been boosted, 
underscoring the importance of research on potential policy rules like the Tay- 
lor rule. 
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